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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper investigates the relationship between CMO tenure and firm risk as 
measured by cost of capital. The author develops a conceptual model linking the direct 
impact of CMO tenure on the firm’s cost of capital and indirect impact through brand 
equity. The hypotheses are tested using data on 125 public US-based firms between 2004 
and 2013. The findings suggest that longer CMO tenure results in higher brand equity. 
Further, longer CMO tenure reduces cost of capital through its impact on brand equity. 
The author also finds that the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity is strengthened 
when the CEO has prior marketing experience as well as when the CEO and CMO have 
same-firm prior experience. However, the impact is weaker when the CEO has greater 
general ability (i.e., generalist). Post-hoc analyses reveals that CMO tenure has 
economically meaningful impact on cost of capital by releasing extra working capital for 
investment outside. The findings imply that a revolving CMO door is costly for the firm. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF CMO TENURE ON BRAND EQUITY 
AND COST OF CAPITAL: INSIGHTS FROM BUSINESS TO 
CONSUMER INDUSTRIES1 
 
The Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) job is a demanding one. Frequent changes in 
consumer behavior, a fragmented media landscape and mounting pressure for 
accountability makes CMOs an ‘endangered species.’ The business press frequently 
laments about declining CMO tenures and that CMO tenure, relative to other executives 
(e.g., CEOs and CFOs), remains significantly lower (Perlberg 2014). A survey study of 
over 150 corporations revealed that over half of them replaced their CMOs in the past 
two years. Kathleen Schaub, a Vice President at IDC, calls this an ‘astonishing 
percentage’ and remarks that the CMO job requirement has shifted from building 
awareness and campaigns to applying analytics and other digital marketing technologies 
to drive revenues (Moorman and Day 2016; Murphy 2014). These trends have led to 
remorseful commentary amongst marketing executives that the CMO job is the ‘most 
dangerous job in business’ (McGirt 2007).  
 Does CMO tenure impact firm performance? Extant research on executive tenure 
in other functions offers two contrasting perspectives to understand this issue. On the one 
hand, frequent CMO turnovers could be detrimental to firm performance because a new 
CMO in the firm would ostensibly seek to alter the focus of marketing efforts and render 
                                                          
1 Swartz, Tracey A., Kartik Kalaignanam, and Satish Jayachandran. To be submitted to 
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marketing campaigns and messages to be inconsistent. This decision-inconsistency could 
adversely impact customers and market perceptions about the brand and diminish firm 
performance (Challagalla, Murtha, and Jaworski 2014). A white paper notes that the cost 
of a revolving door in marketing is significant as a longer tenure allows marketers to test 
initiatives and leverage investments better over time (Katz 2011). On the other hand, long 
tenured CMOs may be susceptible to rigid thinking, cease to make adaptive changes, and 
thus marketing programs might get ‘stale’ rather quickly (Henderson, Miller, and 
Hambrick 2006; Miller 1991). Therefore, shorter CMO tenures could help infuse new 
perspectives, prevent incumbent CMOs from succumbing to internal inertial forces and 
thereby improve market performance.  
 While both perspectives seem plausible from a theoretical standpoint, it is unclear 
if one set of predictions would empirically prevail over the other in the CMO context. 
These concerns are especially relevant because CMO tenure is significantly shorter than 
CEO and CFO tenure. Hence, a systematic understanding of the performance effects of 
CMO tenure is paramount to advancing marketing practice and scholarship. The 
objective of this study is to empirically examine whether CMO tenure matters from the 
standpoint of firm performance. Our performance metric is the firm’s cost of capital. 
There have been calls in marketing that to change the perception of marketing as an 
expense to one of strategic investment, research needs to relate investments in marketing 
assets to the firm’s financing costs and risk (Day and Fahey 1988; Srivastava, Shervani, 
and Fahey 1998). Other researchers note the urgency of establishing marketing’s 
relevance through studies linking customer mindset metrics, like brand equity, to firm 
risk measures, such as the cost of capital (Katsikeas et al. 2016). This study responds to 
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these calls. Furthermore, using the firm’s cost of capital, opposed to more traditional 
measures of firm performance (e.g., Tobin’s Q) allows for us to capture the market value 
of expected future cash flows and growth rates (El Ghoul et al. 2011). Our interest in cost 
of capital is guided by the view that short CMO tenure often leads to inconsistency in 
marketing efforts. It is known that marketing actions create shareholder wealth by not 
only accelerating cash flows but also by reducing the vulnerability of cash flows (Rao 
and Bharadwaj 2008; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Therefore, inconsistency in 
marketing actions should increase the firm’s cost of capital. 
The firm’s cost of capital is the internal rate of return imposed by equity holders 
and debt holders to determine its current market value. If longer CMO tenure lowers the 
equity and debt holder’s perceptions about the riskiness of the firm, then the firm should 
benefit from lower financing costs. In addition, by focusing on a metric like cost of 
capital, we quantify the impact of CMO tenure on working capital needs of the firm and 
derive practical implications about CMO tenure. We argue that greater CMO tenure 
lowers cost of capital by reducing stakeholder uncertainty about the firm’s marketing 
trajectory. Consistency in the firm’s marketing efforts is likely to lower fluctuations in 
performance and thus lower the firm’s working capital needs. Further, we hypothesize 
that superior brand performance is the pathway through which lower financing costs 
manifest. 
Our study makes three important contributions to marketing theory and practice. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the risk impact of 
CMO tenure. Specifically, we test the impact of CMO tenure on brand performance and 
the firm’s cost of capital. Table 1.1 presents an overview of previous research and 
 4 
findings on the CMO-performance relationship. As seen in Table 1.1, research in 
marketing has largely focused on the issue of whether the presence (or absence) of CMOs 
impacts firm performance. The findings from these studies are not entirely consistent. 
While Nath and Mahajan (2008) find no significant relationship between CMO presence 
and firm performance, a study using a larger sample by Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 
(2015) reports a positive relationship between CMO presence and firm performance after 
accounting for endogeneity and unobservable firm heterogeneity. More recently, 
researchers have sought to understand the determinants of CMO turnover (Nath and 
Mahajan 2017), but this does not consider the performance consequences thereof. 
Overall, though prior research has accumulated valuable insights on the CMO presence-
firm performance relationship, research on whether CMO tenure impacts firm 
performance is virtually absent. Moorman and Day (2016, p.17) note that although 
marketing leader turnover is higher than for other leaders, research examining factors that 
influences turnover rates and consequences of turnover for performance is limited. Our 
study responds to this call for research. 
Our second contribution is that we offer empirical evidence on the pathway 
through which CMO tenure impacts firm performance. We argue that greater CMO 
tenure should improve brand equity which in turn should lower the cost of capital. 
Previous research has demonstrated that brand metrics are associated with lower firm risk 
and lower working capital requirements (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011; Rao, 
Bharadwaj, and Hanssens 2017). However, there is virtually no research on how stability 
(or churn) in the marketing C-suite impacts brand performance. This is surprising given 
that CMOs are directly or indirectly custodians and stewards of brand and customer 
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assets. We argue that longer CMO tenure ensures greater consistency and continuity of 
marketing programs and that this benefit should positively impact brand performance. By 
postulating brand performance as a mediator of the CMO tenure and firm performance 
relationship, we offer empirical evidence to support the idea that marketing actions add 
value by reducing vulnerability of cash flows and lowering working capital needs by 
creating market based assets (Rao and Bharadwaj 2008; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
1998).  
Third, our study identifies important contingencies for the CMO tenure-brand 
performance relationship. Based on insights gathered from field interviews with CMOs, 
we focus on CEO specific factors to understand the variation in the relationship between 
CMO tenure and brand performance. The premise of examining CEO specific factors is 
based on a broad consensus in the field interviews that the CEO plays a crucial role in 
allowing the CMO to ensure consistency of marketing efforts, manage customer 
perceptions, and minimize brand confusion in the marketplace. Accordingly, we test the 
moderating influence of a) CEO marketing experience, b) CEO-CMO same-firm prior 
experience and c) CEO general ability (i.e., breadth of skills accumulated through career 
experience). These moderators are of direct importance to managers and offers guidance 
on the (mis)match between CMOs and CEOs from the standpoint of brand and firm 
performance. Finally, we perform post-hoc analyses to demonstrate the economic (dollar) 
impact of CMO tenure on the firm’s financing costs and released working capital.  
The results support our hypotheses and show that CMO tenure is positively 
associated with brand equity and negatively associated with cost of capital. Further, we 
find support for brand equity mediating the impact of CMO tenure on cost of capital. 
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Finally, the moderator results suggest that the positive CMO tenure-brand equity 
relationship is stronger when a) the CEO has prior marketing experience and b) when the 
CMO-CEO have same-firm prior experience. Interestingly, we find that the CMO tenure-
brand equity positive relationship is muted when the CEO has higher general ability. 
Collectively, our findings provide evidence for the positive effects of CMO longevity in 
firms.  
1.1 FIELD INTERVIEWS 
 Given the sparse research on the CMO role and performance effects thereof, 
coupled with limited research on factors affecting the CMO role, we use a theories-in-use 
approach (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007) to gather preliminary insights about key 
factors that CMOs face in improving marketing performance. To identify participants, we 
used the Corporate Affiliations database and personal contacts. We interviewed 24 senior 
marketing executives in the United States. The executives worked in retail, restaurants, 
telecommunications, software, airlines, media and home building industries. The average 
number of employees at firms represented by these executives is 46,000 and the titles 
held by these executives are ‘Chief Marketing Officer’, ‘Executive Vice-President’, 
‘Senior Vice-President’ and ‘Vice-President’.   
 We used a structured questionnaire for the interview. Most of the questions were 
open-ended to elicit opinions and insights from managers in a natural and conversational 
manner. The questions posed to executives focused on the broad topics/themes such as 
the challenges faced by CMOs in improving marketing and financial performance. Most 
of the executives interviewed felt that the tenure of CMOs is relatively shorter compared 
to that of other officers in the C-suite (69%). When asked specifically about key 
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challenges faced by CMOs in proving marketing performance, several respondents 
pointed out that CEOs played a crucial role in allowing CMOs to succeed. In the words 
of one marketing executive: 
“Because many of them don’t really understand marketing, some CEOs think it is 
easier to replace the CMO than similar C positions. We sometimes laugh that 
anybody can be a marketer because people think it is just coming up with a slogan 
or tagline or even less. Obviously, it is far more than that” 
The above response suggests that CEOs may not be adequately familiar with marketing 
and this lack of familiarity could hurt the efforts of long tenured CMOs. In addition, 
respondents also indicated that at times the working style of CMOs and CEOs may be 
incompatible. As one executive puts it: 
“My sense is that the CMO needs to adapt styles and communication to the 
personality of the CEO. The biggest challenges (CMOs and CEOs) are getting on 
the same page regarding the role of marketing and building mutual trust. 
Ultimately, the CMO, should work with the CEO on a more strategic level. But 
that kind of trust has to be earned through success and experience” 
Thus, familiarity and similarity of working styles between CMOs and CEOs provides 
marketing efforts a greater opportunity to succeed. Respondents also indicated that lack 
of CEO-CMO familiarity results in CEOs viewing CMOs as agents for executing short-
term marketing campaigns. We asked follow-up questions on whether certain CEO types 
were more prone to stabilizing (or destabilizing) marketing efforts within the 
organization. Multiple respondents noted that CEOs with broader career experiences do 
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not possess an in-depth understanding of marketing and are an impediment for marketing 
program stability. One of the executives observed that: 
“One of the biggest issues is that most CEOs think whatever they know translates 
to understanding marketing which is not necessarily the case. For example, we 
have a CEO that understands retail lead generation for the mass market. However, 
our business model is the opposite. So, there is frequent questioning why we are 
not using the mass market lead generation tools which are costly and will not 
bring about the targeted results everyone would like.” 
Thus, CEOs with broader experience might expect CMOs to pursue marketing strategies 
from different industries without recognizing that marketing initiatives are context driven 
and not necessarily portable. In summary, the field interviews pointed to three CEO 
related challenges faced by CMOs in improving firm performance. The challenges that 
were mentioned by multiple respondents are i) CEO familiarity with marketing, ii) CEO 
familiarity with the working style of the CMO and iii) CEO career experience breadth.  
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
  Marketing scholars have focused for some time on tracing the impact of 
marketing on financial metrics as opposed to product-market metrics such as volume 
sales or margins. A seminal paper by Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998) notes that 
while the shareholder impact of marketing through higher revenues or lower costs is 
well-recognized, the role of marketing in creating shareholder wealth through lower 
working capital needs is still not understood. More recently, Rao and Bharadwaj (2008) 
lay out a foundation for the impact of marketing actions on total shareholder wealth and 
show that this impact is the sum of two wealth effects: a stock price effect and a released 
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working capital effect. The argument is that the working capital requirements for two 
marketing initiatives that have the same net present value could be quite different. Thus, 
marketing initiatives could release working capital to investors over and above its impact 
on net present value. 
            The substantial rise in the number of CMOs appointed in firms has spurred 
research on the relationship between CMOs and financial performance. To date, this line 
of research has produced somewhat inconsistent results on the CMO effect. Most of this 
prior research has focused on examining whether the presence (or absence) of CMOs 
impacts Tobin’s Q. Our central thesis is that tenure of CMOs is as important (if not more) 
in explaining financial performance because even when a firm has a CMO in place, firm 
performance may not necessarily improve if there are significant and frequent changes to 
marketing programs. Further, we argue that CMOs with greater tenure reduce the 
information asymmetry with investors and lower cost of capital. This reduction in cost of 
capital could be significant and offset the positive stock price effects, which arguably 
accrues because of short CMO tenures. 
Building on these insights, we develop a conceptual framework that delineates the 
direct impact of CMO tenure on firm cost of capital and an indirect impact through brand 
equity. Further, using a contingency perspective, we argue that the relationship between 
CMO tenure and brand equity varies based on the extent of CMO-CEO fit. Synthesizing 
insights from the in-depth field interviews, we propose that the relationship between 
CMO tenure and brand equity is contingent on a) CEO marketing experience, b) CMO-
CEO prior same-firm experience and c) CEO general ability.   
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1.2.1 CMO Tenure and Brand Equity 
 Researchers have noted that marketing actions contribute to shareholder value by 
developing relational market based assets such as brand equity which have the effect of 
accelerating cash flows and/or reducing volatility of cash flows (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and 
Bonfrer 2011; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Accordingly, we expect CMO 
tenure to impact brand equity. We conceptualize brand equity as a customer based metric 
that reflects the customer’s perceptions of the value of the brand. The perceptions 
encompass the customer’s assessment of how relevant the brand is in its category, how 
distinct the brand is, how familiar they are with the brand and the extent to which the 
brand is liked.  
Extant research in marketing recognizes the idea of a brand equity chain and that 
marketing programs and other company actions form the controllable antecedents to the 
brand equity chain (Keller and Lehmann 2003; 2006). Further, the amount of financial 
investment committed to the marketing program does not necessarily guarantee brand 
equity creation. Toward this end, the firm’s actions, rather than the investments made, 
have a strong multiplier effect on brand equity. The actions impact the clarity and 
consistency/integration of the marketing program. In other words, brand equity is likely 
to be shaped by the extent to which current marketing programs are consistent. Eric Eden, 
a senior marketing executive at Cvent, noted, “My experience is that a lot of initiatives 
take years to put in place, so tenure is important. It can make a big economic difference 
in profit and growth. Over time you can learn what really works and optimize,” (Cardona 
2015). Building on these insights, we argue that because short and long tenured CMOs 
pursue different actions, CMO tenure is an important antecedent of brand equity.  
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Although previous research on CEOs suggests that hiring new executives renews 
strategic focus (Adams 2005; Miller 1991), the relatively shorter tenures of CMOs 
underscored in business reports present unique challenges for brands. Greater pressure of 
accountability for the marketing function paradoxically perpetrates changes that are 
counterproductive to brand health. New CMOs often seek new strategies, get rid of PR 
and advertising firms, disrupt current marketing campaigns and continuity in marketing 
messages (Zmuda and Parekh 2013). Katherine Stone, a senior Coca-Cola marketing 
executive echoes this sentiment: “Usually, the new CMO gets rid of everything the prior 
guy championed.... A lot of things get thrown away, which wastes time and money.” The 
qualitative insights from our field interviews corroborates this sentiment and suggests 
that CMOs are frequently hired for implementing a specific tactic/campaign, the shine 
begins to wear off within a short period, and they are replaced. Therefore, CMOs with 
shorter tenures are likely to be detrimental to maintaining or improving brand equity. In 
contrast, we expect relatively longer tenured CMOs to be more able to balance market 
changes with continuity and propel brand performance. Based on these insights, we 
propose the following baseline hypothesis:  
 H1: Higher the CMO tenure, higher the brand equity.  
1.2.2 CMO Tenure and Brand Equity: The Moderating Impact of Prior CEO 
Marketing Experience 
 Previous research has used the notion of shared mental models to explain team 
performance (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse 1993). The shared mental model 
framework explains how teams adapt to changing conditions--that is, how teams can 
quickly and efficiently adjust their strategy "on the fly." Further, team members may need 
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to share many mental models pertaining to multiple aspects of the job. Marketing is a 
boundary spanning activity that requires cooperation with other top management team 
(TMT) members, such as CEOs, CFOs, and CIOs. The CEO’s marketing experience is 
one such aspect that provides familiarity with the task at hand. When team members have 
similar prior functional experience, communication is easier, positively impacting team 
performance (Simons, Pelled, and Smith 1999; Smith et al. 1994). Additionally, shared 
functional expertise has been shown to lead to easier conflict resolution (Auh and 
Menguc 2005; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997) which should positively impact performance 
by enabling efficient decision making.   
 When the CEO has marketing experience, they are more likely to not only 
understand the importance of marketing but also understand the language of marketing 
and set realistic expectations for the CMO. Studies have noted that firms with a 
marketing CEO tend to prioritize marketing, highlighting consistency and collaboration 
of marketing decision-making (Whitler 2017). Such CEOs are likely to grant CMOs the 
authority within the C-suite to garner the necessary support (i.e., financial, product 
development) from other TMT members to grow marketing assets. One of the key 
challenges in long tenured CMOs being able to pursue brand building activities is 
whether CEOs have the patience for return on investments in marketing to accrue. We 
expect CEOs with marketing experience to be relatively more patient with marketing 
programs because they are more likely to consider spending on marketing as an 
investment and not as an expense. As such, CEOs with marketing experience might 
allocate greater marketing budgets to CMOs and be more patient awaiting results, thereby 
nurturing brand assets. These advantages from the shared functional background with 
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CEO should provide the longer tenured CMO the latitude to improve brand performance. 
Consequently, we propose: 
H1a: The positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity is stronger 
when the CEO has prior marketing experience.  
1.2.3 CMO Tenure and Brand Equity: The Moderating Impact of Same-Firm Prior 
Experience 
 In addition to shared mental models about the task, other aspects such as how well 
members work together also influences team performance. In the context of TMTs, an 
executive’s prior work experiences shape his/her way of thinking and interacting with 
others (Zajac and Westphal 1996). When TMT members have shared executive 
experiences, such as both having worked for the same firm in the past (regardless of 
whether they worked there concurrently), greater trust and mutual expectation should 
result from shared learning experiences. The presence of same-firm prior experience is 
likely to result in a degree of working-style familiarity between the CEO and CMO. 
Familiarity with members has been shown to improve productivity by facilitating 
coordination and integration of team member efforts and better decision making 
(Goodman and Garber 1988; Jehn and Shah 1997).  However, some research finds that 
familiarity between team members may also have harmful effects on team performance. 
A high level of familiarity between team members fosters pressures for unanimity that in 
turn can suppress the expression of vital alternative perspectives and impair group 
decisions (Harrison et al. 2003).  
 We expect the shared experience of having worked at the same firm previously to 
be beneficial for brand performance for the following reasons. First, we do not expect the 
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possible negative effects of high familiarity to damper the CMOs ability to maintain 
strong brand equity because our measure is not a measure of the degree of overlap at the 
prior firm. Second, since the marketing function faces the challenge of demonstrating 
accountability because returns on investments take time to accrue, we expect that trust 
and mutual expectations will prevail due to familiarity with the shared learning 
experiences gained from having worked at the same firm previously. CEOs familiar with 
CMOs should be aware of the CMOs working style and past marketing efforts and should 
be more trusting of the CMOs ability. This “head start” should enable the CMO to make 
more efficient decisions about marketing programs and improve brand equity. In contrast, 
when the CEO does not have prior familiarity with CMO, continuity of marketing 
programs is likely to get impeded because of lack of understanding of the CMO’s 
perspective. Thus, we expect: 
H1b: The positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity is stronger 
when the CEO and CMO have same-firm prior experience.  
1.2.4 CMO Tenure and Brand equity: The Moderating Impact of CEO General Ability 
 It is known that the career experiences of CEOs influence corporate decisions and 
performance (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2005). Previous 
research examines the job histories of executives and classifies them on a general ability 
continuum (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013). CEOs with more general ability (i.e., 
generalists) have broader skills that are portable across several industries compared to 
CEOs with less general ability (Murphy and Zábojník 2004; 2007). Generalist CEOs earn 
a wage premium in the labor market because they are more growth oriented and are 
expected to adapt better to technology and industry shocks than specialist CEOs 
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(Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013). However, generalist CEOs also have superfluous 
knowledge or lack specialized knowledge of other functional areas.  
 We argue that generalist CEOs pose significant impediments for the CMO tenure 
and brand performance relationship. As noted before, longer tenure allows CMOs to 
build consistency in marketing messaging and develop a comprehensive marketing 
strategy with long term objectives. Longer tenured CMOs are able nurture marketing 
assets like brands through their superior understanding of markets and customers. This 
specialized knowledge increases the efficiency of investments in brand building over the 
course of a CMOs’ tenure. However, generalist CEOs are known to be growth oriented, 
disruptive and challenging of the status quo (Brockman, Lee, and Salas 2016; Custódio, 
Ferreira, and Matos 2013). We argue that because generalist CEOs have a superfluous 
knowledge of marketing, they are more likely to view it as a short-term tool for growth, 
negatively impact brand equity. Prior research suggests that when managers have 
different mental models, such as in the case of a generalist CEO and functional specialist 
(i.e., CMO), marketing decision making suffers from inconsistencies (Challagalla, 
Murtha, and Jaworski 2014; Wind 2006). These inconsistencies may therefore weaken 
the positive impact of CMO tenure on brand equity. Thus, we propose: 
H1c: The positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity is weaker 
when the CEO has more general ability. 
1.2.5 CMO Tenure and Cost of Capital 
 As noted before, we expect CMO tenure to be negatively related to the firm’s cost 
of capital. Cost of capital refers to the rate of return expected by shareholders and debt-
holders and it reflects the stakeholder’s assessment of firm riskiness. Although firms have 
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multiple stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, suppliers), we focus on two key 
stakeholders, equity holders and debt holders. An increase in cost of capital represents an 
increase in the riskiness of the firm. Firms which are viewed as having risky investments 
are penalized by investors with a higher cost of capital. As cost of capital increases, 
strategic investment opportunities for the firm could change. Higher cost of capital may 
damage the firms’ future growth potential and even threaten its survival (Easley and 
O’Hara 2004).  
We expect CMO tenure to impact cost of capital through the mechanisms of 
greater investor attention and superior brand performance. First, we expect CMO tenure 
to have a direct effect on cost of capital because it is likely to reduce information 
asymmetry with investors and increase the salience of the firm’s stocks. Past research in 
finance has shown that for investors, attention is a scarce resource and that they tend to 
invest in stocks with which they are familiar (Huberman 2001; Lou 2014). As noted 
before, long tenured CMOs are likely to better leverage investments in advertising to 
build consistent and clear marketing messages, raising the knowledge and understanding 
of the brand—a key component of brand equity. This continuity in marketing efforts is 
likely to solidify the investor’s familiarity and confidence with the firm’s securities. A 
better understanding of the firm’s marketing trajectory should increase the breadth of 
ownership of the firm’s stock as well as improve stock liquidity (Chemmanur and Yan 
2010; Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov 2005; Lou 2014).  
In addition to the direct effect on cost of capital, we also expect CMO tenure to 
impact cost of capital though brand equity. Past research has examined the relationship 
between brand metrics and firm risk measures such as systematic risk, working capital 
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requirements and found support for a negative relationship (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 
2011; Rao, Bharadwaj, and Hanssens 2017). The primary reasons listed for risk reduction 
are stronger brand loyalty (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001) which results in repeat 
purchases (Keller and Lehmann 2006) and lower consumer price sensitivity resulting 
from higher quality (Aaker and Jacobson 1994). These benefits of higher equity brands 
should buffer it from adverse macroeconomic shocks and lower the operating shortfall for 
firms in uncertain economic states. These arguments suggest that long tenured CMOs 
should be able to improve brand equity and lower the firm’s cost of capital.  Accordingly, 
we advance the following hypotheses: 
 H2a: Higher the CMO tenure, lower the cost of capital. 
 H2b: Brand equity mediates the effect of CMO tenure on cost of capital. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.3.1 Data 
 The data for the study was assembled from numerous sources. The sample of 
CMOs was originally drawn from the CMOSONTHEMOVE data source for the period 
2004-2013. Since we are interested in CMO tenure and because this database collects and 
reports press releases about CMO appointments, it was an appropriate source to start data 
collection. The firms in the initial sample are in the top quartile of their industries with 
respect to revenues and total assets. This data source documents changes in CMO and 
CMO appointments for primarily business-to-consumer firms in the United States. CMOs 
in our sample refer to marketing executives that have direct reporting relationships with 
CEOs. We are focused on CMOs with a direct reporting relationship because we are 
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interested in studying firms that are committed to and value marketing, as evidenced by 
C-level access (Cardona 2015). As such, CMOs who report directly to the CEO are more 
likely to have managerial discretion and decision-making authority opposed to CMOs 
who do not report to the CEO. Since we are interested in studying the effect CMO tenure 
has on brand equity, the focus on CMOs that report to the CEO is paramount. A typical 
CMO move announcement identifies the new marketing executive joining a firm and the 
old marketing executive being replaced. To operationalize CMO tenure, we searched 
press releases and news announcements to gather information on the date when the new 
CMO exited the firm and when the old CMO was appointed to the position. We followed 
this procedure to identify CMOs with direct reporting relationships to CEOs and their 
tenure for all firms in the initial set between 2004 and 2013. We focus on firms that 
primarily operate as business-to-consumer firms because we are interested in identifying 
the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity. As such, a focus on firms that advertise more 
heavily, such as business-to-consumer firms, is appropriate given our research interests. 
We chose to focus on a ten-year period between 2004 and 2013 because data on CMO 
moves is more readily available from 2004. Further, focusing on a longer period allows 
us to capture multiple CMO transitions within firms and disentangle CMO-specific, 
CEO-specific and firm-specific factors influencing CMO tenure. The filters applied to the 
initial set of firms is as follows. We retained firms if there was objective information that 
the firm did not have a CMO in place for a year or period. For example, in some cases, 
the CMO appointment/exit news report indicated that a firm was creating a CMO 
position for the first time. In other cases, the CMO role was vacant for a period related to 
the replacement search process. While succession planning is common with the CEO, it 
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is less common for CMO roles (Whitler 2018). So, we kept these firms in our sample 
because there was no ambiguity as to the identity of the CMO. For approximately 20% of 
the firms in our sample, there was ambiguity about the identity of the CMO for a subset 
of the sample period. We dropped these firms from the sample because including 
observations where ambiguity exists about the identity of the CMO could lead to biased 
results. Finally, we dropped twelve firms which had CMOs in place for 10 years or more 
to avoid undue influence from outliers. Using these filters, we assembled a final sample 
of 125 firms between 2004 and 2013 (i.e., 1250 firm-year observations) that 
unambiguously had a CMO in place or had no CMO position. In this sample, there are 
237 firm-year observations in which there was no CMO in place. Our final sample of 
1250 firm-year observations corresponds to 304 CMOs. It is worth noting that 40 CMOs 
moved to firms within the sample implying that our sample is comprised of 264 unique 
CMOs. 
1.3.2 Measures 
CMO tenure. The focal variable in our study is operationalized as the number of 
months in each firm-year observation between the CMO’s time of appointment and exit.  
Brand equity. Data on brand equity was sourced from BAV (Brand Asset 
Valuator) Consulting. BAV conducts the largest study of brands and consumers with data 
from over 680,000 consumers from over 60 countries from the past 15 years. The brand 
valuator data has been utilized in several recent marketing studies (Larkin 2013; Mizik 
2014) and is shown to be positively correlated with firm performance. We utilize BAV’s 
brand asset measure as our measure of brand equity, which has been noted as an 
appropriate measure of brand equity (Keller and Lehmann 2006). The measure reflects 
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both brand strength (relevance and differentiation) and brand stature (esteem and 
knowledge). For firms that contain multiple brands, we average the brand equity score 
across all brands under the parent firm.  
Cost of capital. Our dependent measure is the firm’s cost of capital calculated 
using the weighted average cost of capital (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005, pp. 524-
534). To compute this measure, we first estimated the cost of equity using the capital 
asset pricing model. Following this, we estimated the before-tax cost of debt as the 
interest expense paid divided by the sum of all interest-bearing debt. We then weighted 
the cost of equity and debt by the proportion of equity and debt, respectively, to get the 
weighted average cost of capital. We collected data on the proportion of debt and equity 
and cost of debt from COMPUSTAT. Data on the risk-free rate and market premium 
were collected from Fama French & Liquidity Factors database. Information on the 
firm’s beta were collected from CRSP and Yahoo! Charts.  
CEO prior marketing experience. Prior literature suggests that the marketing 
experience of CEOs might facilitate more efficient decision making in the realm of 
marketing (Buyl et al. 2011). Accordingly, we include a dummy variable that captures 
whether the CEO has prior work experience in a marketing function. Data on this 
variable was collected from Corporate Affiliations and executive profiles. We 
operationalize this as a dummy variable because the length of time for which a CEO 
served in a marketing function was not readily available from executive profiles. We 
examined alternate specifications of CMO prior marketing experience, including whether 
the marketing experience was more recent (i.e., one of the most recent two positions) or 
whether the marketing experience was strategic (i.e., has an EVP title associated with the 
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role). The results using these specifications did not change the results and analyses 
related to these are omitted for brevity.  
Same-firm prior experience. We operationalized ‘Same-Firm Prior Experience’ 
using a dummy variable that reflects whether the CMO and CEO had worked for the 
same organization in the past. It is worthwhile to note that this does not capture whether 
the CEO and CMO worked at the same firm at the same time but rather captures whether 
they have both worked at firm ‘X’ in the past. We do not observe instances in the data 
where CMO and CEO share multiple same-firm prior experience and we are not able to 
capture the dates related to prior work experience, so this variable is dummy coded. Also, 
we are primarily interested in this variable from the standpoint of how the executive’s 
mindset and thinking is shaped. So, looking at whether the CEO and CMO previously 
both worked at the same firm in the past as a dummy variable adequately captures this 
notion. This data was collected from Corporate Affiliations and executive biographies.  
CEO/CMO general ability. Following past research (see Custódio, Ferreira and 
Matos 2013), we relied on five proxies to capture the breadth of skills held by the 
CEO/CMO.  
1. Number of positions: This measure is based on the number of past titles held 
by the CEO/CMO. CEOs/CMOs with more titles, and hence more positions, 
should have been exposed to different organizational areas.   
2. Number of firms: This measure captures the number of firms for which the 
CEO/CMO worked in the past. Executives who work for multiple firms are 
exposed to a variety of organizational knowledge bases, allowing for the 
 22 
development of more general skills than those who have only worked for one 
firm and hence possessing firm-specific skills.  
3. Number of industries: This variable measures the number of industries in 
which the CEO/CMO has worked, based on the four-digit SIC code. The more 
industries in which an executive has worked, the greater variety of 
environment he or she has been exposed to, contributing to his/ her general 
skills base.  
4. Prior CEO/CMO experience: This is a dummy variable that captures whether 
the CEO/CMO held a CEO/CMO position previously. CEOs/CMOs who have 
held a similar position in the past are more likely to be aware of the skills 
needed to perform in the current position. 
5. Conglomerate experience: This is a dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO/CMO 
has worked for a multi-division firm. In general, prior experience in a business 
with different operating segments could expose executives to varying business 
conditions and help develop skills that could be transferred to different 
business contexts.  
We collected data on these five observable variables for CEOs/CMOs from the Corporate 
Affiliations database and annual company filings. As in prior research (Custódio, Ferreira 
and Matos 2013), to increase the explanatory power while reducing multicollinearity and 
minimizing the measurement error, we performed a principal components analysis on the 
five variables, extracting a unidimensional general ability variable. Note that these five 
indicants are standardized before extracting principal components. Higher scores on the 
extracted component imply higher generalist skills for the CEO/CMO. By controlling for 
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CMO general ability, we capture the breadth and depth of a CMOs work experience 
which contributes to the CMOs ability to impact brand equity.  
We also collected data on several control variables related to CMO and CEO 
characteristics. Data on CMO gender, whether the CMO had a MBA degree and whether 
the CMO was an internal promotion or an external hire were collected by coding press 
releases and executive biographies. It is possible that CMOs with higher titles have been 
employed in the firm for a longer time and therefore expected to stay longer as well. We 
examined the titles of CMOs to identify their structural influence in the organization. We 
examined whether a marketing officer held the title of an ‘Executive Vice-President’ 
(EVP). Although firms are likely to differ with respect to the titles accorded to 
executives, CMOs with EVP titles could potentially have higher tenures. The data for this 
variable was collected from CMO hiring news reports and executive biographies.  
A source of uncertainty for CMOs (and other C-suite officers) is the likelihood of 
management changes when a new CEO is appointed. New CEOs often seek to alter the 
direction and focus of the organization and hire new TMT members to pursue that 
objective. We collected data on whether the firm had a new CEO by coding the firm’s 
10K and annual reports. We also collected data on firm and industry characteristics as 
they are expected to influence a firm’s decision to hire and keep a CMO. Consistent with 
previous research (Nath and Mahajan 2008), we included advertising intensity as a 
predictor of CMO tenure. Data on this variable was procured from COMPUSTAT. It is 
also known that the marketing function is frequently under fire when performance is 
lower and appreciated more when performance is higher. We included the firm’s earnings 
(before interest and tax) in the previous year as a proxy for firm performance. The data 
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for this variable was obtained from COMPUSTAT. Finally, we collected data on the 
number of analysts following a firm from the I/B/E/S database. This variable captures the 
extent of information asymmetry between firms and the investment community. The 
variable operationalization and data sources are presented in Table 1.2. 
1.3.3 Model Development 
 Endogeneity of CMO Tenure. Although our principal interest is in testing the 
impact of CMO tenure on brand equity and cost of capital, firms may be strategic about 
when to change CMOs. Therefore, ignoring this endogeneity is likely to lead to biased 
estimates and possibly erroneous conclusions. For instance, some firms and CEOs might 
view the marketing function as a tactical role and seek to replace them on a regular basis. 
This endogeneity problem is frequently encountered in applied work and addressed using 
instrumental variables. We use CMO gender as an instrument to create exogenous 
variation in CMO tenure. Past research in management and economics suggests that 
work-life balance poses greater challenges for women than men (Dreher 2003). 
Consistent with this stream of research, we expect CMO tenure for women to be shorter 
than for men. However, there is no theoretical basis to expect CMO gender to be 
significantly related to brand equity and cost of capital. Thus, CMO gender satisfies the 
theoretical requirements of being a valid instrument in our setting.  
 We model CMO tenure as a Weibull distribution, W (λ, p) where λ is the scale 
parameter and p is the shape parameter. Further, to interpret the estimates in terms of 
time to CMO exit, we use an accelerated failure time (AFT) metric. It is worthwhile to 
note that by modeling this with an AFT metric, we can capture the predicted length of 
CMO tenure. This model is not capturing the risk or hazard rate for a CMO no longer 
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being in the CMO role at time t. The duration of CMOs in an AFT metric can be 
expressed as follows: 
jt 1 j 2 j 3 j 4 jt
5 it 6 k 6 it 7 it 8-9
10-18 jt
CMOTEN = exp[μ + α CMOGENDER + α CMOMBA + α CMOINTERN + α CMOEVPTITLE
+α CEOCHANGE + α CEOMKTG + α FIRMEARNINGS + α ADINTEN + α INDUSTRY
+α YEA    R + σε ]                                                 Equation 1                                                            
 
Where CMOTEN = Tenure of CMO ‘j’ at time ‘t’, CMOGENDER = gender of CMO ‘j’, 
CMOMBA = MBA degree of CMO ‘j’, CMOINTERN = internal or external hire of 
CMO ‘j’,  CMOEVPTITLE = executive VP title of CMO ‘j’ at time ‘t’, CEOCHANGE = 
whether firm ‘i’ had a new CEO at time ‘t’, CEOMKTG = whether CEO ‘k’ had 
marketing experience, FIRMEARNINGS = earnings of firm ‘i’' at time ‘t’, ADINTEN = 
advertising intensity of firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’, INDUSTRY = industry specific fixed effects 
and YEAR = year specific fixed effects. The parameter estimates are α1- α18 and εjt is 
the error term.  
 Equation (1) could be misspecified if unobservable firm characteristics influence 
CMO selection and CMO duration. To account for this possibility, we use clustered 
robust standard errors (Liang and Zeger 1986). The clustered standard errors are larger 
than those obtained from conventional estimation thereby making the hypotheses tests 
more conservative. The clustered robust standard errors also control for firm-specific 
heteroskedasticity (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). We note that employing 
clustered standard errors by firms is equivalent to modeling firm-specific random effects 
for the intercept (Moulton 1986).  
 To test the effect of CMO tenure on brand equity, we use predicted CMO tenure 
scores from equation (1). Brand equity is then modeled as a linear combination of CMO 
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tenure, CEO characteristics and control variables such as industry and year specific 
effects.  
BEQUITY = β +β CMOTEN +β CEOMKT +β CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP +β CEOGENAB
it 0 1 jt 2 kt 3 kt 4 kt
+β CMOTEN *CEOMKTG +β CMOTEN *CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP +β CMOTEN *CEOGENAB
5 jt k 6 jt k 7 jt kt
+β CMOGENAB +β INDUSTRY +β YEAR + υ                  
8 jt 9 -10 11-19 it
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
                                           Equation 2
Where BEQUITY = brand equity for firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’, jt
ˆCMOTEN is the predicted 
CMO duration from equation (1), CEOMKT = whether the CEO has prior marketing 
experience, CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP  = whether the CMO and CEO worked at the same 
firm at a point in his/her career, CEOGENAB = general ability of the CEO ‘k’ at time ‘t’, 
CMOGENAB general ability of the CMO ‘j’ at time ‘t’, is the random error. As in 
(1), we use clustered robust standard errors to estimate equation (2).  
To test the effect of brand equity on cost of capital, we use predicted brand equity 
scores from equation (2). Cost of capital is then modeled as a linear combination of brand 
equity, CMO tenure, CEO characteristics and control variables such as SGA intensity, 
total assets, analyst coverage, industry and year specific effects.  
 
it 0 1 it 2 jt 3 kt 4 it 5 it
6 it 7-8 9-17 it
CoC = δ + δ BEQUITY + δ CMOTEN + δ CEOTEN + δ SGAINTEN + δ ASSETS
+δ ANALYCOV + δ INDUSTRY + δ YEAR + ψ                                                       Equation 3
ˆˆ
 
Where CoC = cost of capital of firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’, CEOTEN = tenure of CEO ‘k’ at time 
‘t’, SGAINTEN = sales, general, and administrative expense intensity of firm ‘i’ at time 
‘t’, ASSETS = total assets of firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’ and ANALYCOV= analyst coverage of 
firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’.  
There are a few econometric issues pertaining to the error structure in equations (2) 
and (3) which need to be accounted for. CMOs tend to switch between firms in our 
it
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sample. This migration of CMOs leads to possibly contemporaneous correlation between 
cross-sectional units. Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.702) suggest that “NT correlated 
observations have less information than NT independent observations.” Thus, ignoring 
the error correlation between cross-sectional units could lead to erroneous conclusions. 
Similarly, there could be first order autocorrelation in the brand equity and cost of capital 
measures. As suggested by Creel and Farell (1996), we use feasible generalized least 
square estimation (XTGLS in STATA 13) to estimate equations (2) and (3) with cross-
sectional dependence, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
1.4 RESULTS 
1.4.1 Model Free Evidence 
 Our sample is comprised of CMOs and CEOs in the business-to-consumer space. 
The distribution of firms by two-digit SIC codes is reported in Table 1.3.  As seen in 
Table 1.3, 38% of the firms in the sample are in the retailing industry (e.g., general 
merchandise & food stores, clothing retailers and restaurants) whereas 37% of the firms 
are in the manufacturing industry (e.g., sanitary products, news publishing, cosmetics, 
shaving products, computers and telecommunications). The remaining 25% of the firms 
in the sample are in the consumer services industry (e.g., banks/financial services, hotels, 
airlines, car rentals, cruise lines). 
 The summary statistics for the variables appear in Table 1.4. As seen in Table 1.4, 
the mean tenure for CMOs is approximately 35 months. However, we find considerable 
variation in CMO tenure across industries in our sample. For example, CMOs for 
financial services, hotel and car rental industries (e.g., E-Trade, JP Morgan, MET Life, 
Hilton, and Hertz) have durations in the 90% percentile (i.e., average duration exceeding 
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66 months) whereas CMOs in the retailing industries (e.g., Arby’s, Einstein Noah, 
Family Dollar and Hancock) have durations in the 20% percentile (i.e., average duration 
less than 20 months). CMO tenure also appears to have increased in our data period from 
an average duration of 40 months in 2004 to 52 months in 2013. The CEO tenure variable 
shows relatively less variation and the mean CEO tenure is 66 months. The average brand 
equity score is about 71.   
1.4.2 Model-based Results: Predictors of CMO Tenure 
 Though our primary interest is not in predicting CMO tenure, we need to account 
for the endogeneity of CMO tenure. Therefore, we use a duration model to estimate CMO 
tenure. Not much theory or empirical evidence is available to predict the shape of the 
CMO tenure process. Therefore, to overcome misspecification bias, we compare several 
distributions. These distributions are continuous because CMO exit could occur at any 
time. We estimate AFT models incorporating exponential, Weibull, log-logistic, and 
Gamma CMO tenure distributions. Since the Weibull distribution offers the best fit based 
on Bayesian Information Criteria statistic, we model CMO tenure as a Weibull regression 
with an accelerated failure time metric. The results of the determinants of CMO tenure 
appear in Table 1.5. The duration dependence parameter is positive and significant (2.20, 
p<.01). Therefore, the length of time a CMO has been in his/her job, affects the 
likelihood of CMO turnover or exit.  
 The results in Table 1.5 suggest that the tenure of female CMOs is shorter than 
that of their male counterparts (-.16, p<.05). Likewise, we find CMOs holding MBAs to 
have shorter tenure (-.19, p<.01). Executives who have MBAs may have more general 
knowledge about other functional areas (Murphy and Zábojník 2004) and thus, greater 
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mobility. We do not find the effect of internal versus external CMOs on tenure to be 
significant (.05, p>.1). Additionally, tenure is longer for CMOs who also hold ‘Executive 
Vice President’ titles (.21, p<.01). The results also suggest that when firm earnings (i.e., 
EBIT) is higher, CMO tenure is also higher (1.5x 10-5, p<.05). This finding is in line with 
anecdotal evidence, which suggests that the marketing leadership and function are under 
greater scrutiny when firm performance is lower. Regarding the control variables, the 
results suggest that CMOs in retail industries have shorter tenure (-.3, p<.01) than those 
in financial and service industries. The shorter tenure of retail CMOs might reflect the 
uncertainty that online retailing has wrought over the industry. 
1.4.3 CMO Tenure, Cost of Capital and Brand equity  
 H1 predicts that CMO tenure has a positive impact on brand equity. As seen in 
Column I of Table 1.6, the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity is positive and 
significant (.065, p<.01). Furthermore, as seen in Column VI of Table 1.6, the main effect 
of CMO tenure on brand equity remains positive and significant (.094, p<.01) when 
interactions are not included in the model. H1 is supported. This finding is consistent 
with prior research, which suggests that clarity and consistency in marketing are 
controllable antecedents of brand equity (Keller and Lehmann 2003).  
We next turn to the moderating hypotheses. In support of H1a, we find that the 
interaction between CMO tenure and CEO prior marketing experience on brand equity is 
positive and significant albeit at the 10% level (.03, p<.10). The direct effect of CEO 
prior marketing experience on brand equity is not significant (p>.10). Collectively, the 
findings imply that longer tenured CMOs improve brand performance when CEOs have 
prior marketing experience. However, CEOs with prior marketing experience may not 
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have the needed expertise to improve brand performance by themselves. To gain a better 
understanding of these findings, we performed additional analyses.2 Recall that we 
operationalized ‘CEO Marketing Experience’ as whether the CEO had worked in a 
marketing function in the past. We created a new dummy measure of CEO marketing 
experience to distinguish between recent marketing experience versus distant marketing 
experience. We find that the interaction effect of CMO tenure and CEO marketing 
experience continues to be positive and significant. However, the direct effect of CEO 
marketing experience on brand equity turns out to be positive and significant (p<.05). 
These analyses suggest that increases in CMO tenure can realize superior brand 
performance when CEOs have a marketing background.  
H1b hypothesized that the positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand 
equity is stronger when the CMO and CEO have same-firm prior experience. As seen in 
Column I of Table 1.6, the direct effect of same-firm prior experience on brand equity is 
not significant (p>.10) while the interaction effect of CMO tenure and is positive and 
significant (.05, p<.05). H3c is thus supported. This finding implies that same-firm prior 
experience of CEOs and CMOs provides a shared understanding and helps CMOs to 
improve brand performance as their tenure increases.  
H1c predicts that the positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity 
will be weaker for CEOs with greater general ability. We find the direct effect of CEO 
general ability on brand equity to be positive (1.81, p<.01). Consistent with H1c, we find 
the interaction of CMO tenure and CEO general ability to be negative and significant (-
.01, p<.05). This suggests that CMOs who work under CEOs with more general ability 
                                                          
2 Not reported in the interest of brevity. Available upon request. 
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may face challenges in maintaining consistency in marketing programs, resulting in 
negative consequences to the brand. We controlled for the CMO’s general ability since 
the breadth of career experience of the CMO may influence brand equity. We do not find 
the impact of CMO general ability on brand equity to be significant (-.15, p>.1). We also 
find the eight year-specific dummy variables to be positive relative to the base year of 
2013. Regarding industry specific effects, we find that manufacturing (12.59, p<.01) and 
retail industries (11.12 p<.01), have higher brand equity than financial and services 
industries.   
To test the effect of CMO tenure on cost of capital, we use predicted CMO tenure 
scores from equation (1). H2a predicts that higher CMO tenure would lower the firm’s 
cost of capital. The results reported in Column II of Table 1.6, show that CMO tenure is 
negatively associated with cost of capital (-.00025, p<.01). H2a is supported. We 
performed additional analyses to examine the robustness of this result. Recall that we 
computed cost of capital as the weighted average cost of debt and equity. In additional 
analyses, we tested for the effect of CMO tenure separately on cost of debt and equity. 
These results appear in Columns III and IV of Table 1.6. We find that the effect of CMO 
tenure on cost of equity is negative and significant and the effect on cost of debt to be 
insignificant (p>.10). In addition, we also tested the effect of CMO tenure on the firm’s 
systematic risk (beta) and find that it continues to load negatively at the 1% level 
(Column V of Table 1.6). Collectively, we interpret these findings as evidence that longer 
CMO tenure is viewed by investors as indicative of lower cash flow volatility and 
reduced working capital requirements.  
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The results suggest that the effect of CEO tenure on cost of capital is negative (-
4.0 x 10-5, p<.01). We find the regression estimate of SGA intensity on cost of capital to 
be negative (-.048, p<.01), suggesting that more marketing expenses reduces information 
asymmetry with investors. The effect of total assets on cost of capital is positive (5.85 x 
10 -8, p<.01). Consistent with expectations, we find the impact of analyst coverage on 
cost of capital to be negative and significant (-.0011, p<.01). Additionally, we do not find 
the industry specific effects to be significant (p>.10).  
To test H2b (i.e., the mediating role of brand equity), we use predicted brand 
equity scores from equation (2). We test the effect of CMO tenure on firm cost of capital 
in the presence of brand equity. As shown in Table 1.7, the effect of CMO tenure on firm 
cost of capital is not significant in the presence of brand equity (p>.10). However, the 
effect of brand equity on cost of capital is significant and negative (-.001, p<.01), 
suggesting that higher levels of brand equity reduces the firm’s cost of capital. The 
results provide support for H2b, suggesting that brand equity mediates the relationship 
between CMO tenure and cost of capital. Therefore, the findings imply that CMO 
tenure’s effect on cost of capital manifests through brand equity. Consistent with 
expectations, we find CEO tenure to be also negatively related to cost of capital (-.00007, 
p<.01). As in the direct effects model, SGA intensity is negatively related to cost of 
capital (-.07, p<.01). In addition, we find total assets to be positively related to cost of 
capital (6.96 x 10-8, p<.01) and analyst coverage to be negatively related to cost of capital 
(-.0016, p<.01). Finally, the results suggest that retail has higher cost of capital than 
financial and service industries (.01, p<.01).  
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1.4.4 Additional Analyses 
 In this section, we discuss and report the results of a battery of additional analyses 
conducted to evaluate whether our core evidence that CMO tenure increases brand equity 
and reduces cost of capital is robust to other concerns of endogeneity and non-linear 
effects of CMO tenure. Overall, the results from these validation checks reported in Table 
1.8 are not materially different from those of the primary analysis.  
 Other Sources of Endogeneity. One concern in relation to the analysis is the 
potential endogeneity because of omitted variables that may cloud the interpretation of 
the relationship between CMO tenure and cost of capital. An alternate explanation for our 
results is that CMO tenure and cost of capital could be driven by the firm’s desire for 
higher growth. That is, firms seeking higher growth might strategically settle for shorter 
CMO tenures and higher cost of capital. If so, the objective function of the firm could be 
maximizing growth opportunities as opposed to lowering financing costs. Although this 
possibility ignores the fact that firms that seek to maximize net present value without 
consideration to the amount of capital deployed are likely to get displaced by competition 
in the long-run (Rao and Bharadwaj 2008), we nonetheless performed additional analyses 
to test this alternate explanation. We operationalized the firm’s growth potential using 
Tobin’s Q. We then ran regressions to examine the impact of CMO tenure on the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q. The results of these analyses are reported in Column I of Table 1.8. As seen in 
Table 1.8, the impact of CMO tenure on Tobin’s Q is not statistically significant (p>.10). 
This evidence rules out firm growth opportunities as an alternate explanation for our 
findings.  
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 Another potential concern is one of reverse causality in which the firm’s cost of 
capital may drive CMO tenure. The argument is that lower cost of capital may provide 
slack resources to firms that could in turn be deployed to support marketing programs. 
The additional resources may enable CMOs to perform better and, thus, lengthen their 
tenure in the organization. While this explanation is theoretically possible, it is worth 
noting that we already include firm earnings as a determinant of CMO tenure and use 
predicted CMO tenure scores in our subsequent analyses. Therefore, we rule out reverse 
causality from cost of capital to CMO tenure as a potential explanation for our findings. 
Likewise, one could argue for a possible reverse causal effect from brand equity to CMO 
tenure. That is, higher brand equity would lead to longer CMO tenures. This is not a 
concern in our context because of the temporal separation between the CMO effect and 
brand equity measure. In our setting, brand equity is measured at the end of the fiscal 
year and the CMO tenure is measured from the time the executive is hired. For instance, 
although we link CMO tenure at time ‘t’ to brand equity at time ‘t’ in our empirical 
specifications, the CMO effect on marketing program temporally precedes the brand 
equity measured at the end of the year. Therefore, the possibility of reverse causation 
from brand equity to CMO tenure is not a serious threat to our findings.    
 Non-linear Effects of CMO Tenure. In this subsection, we test whether CMO 
tenure has non-linear effects on brand equity. Specifically, we investigate the possibility 
that CMO tenure has ceiling effects such that at higher levels of CMO tenure, brand 
equity is adversely impacted. The reasoning is that as CMO tenure increases, marketing 
programs might stagnate and get out of sync with customer needs. To test this effect, we 
included a quadratic term for CMO tenure in the brand equity specification. The results 
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of this analysis appear in Column II of Table 1.8. As seen in Table 1.8, although the 
linear term of CMO tenure continues to be positive and significant (.07, p<.05), the 
quadratic term for CMO tenure is not significant (p>.10). Therefore, while a non-linear 
effect (inverted-U) of CMO tenure on brand equity seems theoretically plausible, this 
effect is not borne out in our data possibly because tenure of CMOs is not adequately 
long in our empirical setting.  
1.5 DISCUSSION 
 Triggered by the ongoing discussion about the influence (or lack thereof) of 
marketing and CMOs, we investigate whether CMO tenure impacts brand equity and 
shareholder wealth through firm risk (i.e., cost of capital). We next outline the 
implications of the study for marketing theory and practice.  
1.5.1 Research Contributions 
 Our study makes three important contributions to marketing theory and research. 
First, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate the impact of 
CMO tenure on firm performance. We use cost of capital as our performance metric. 
Extant research has thus far focused on examining whether the presence of CMOs in 
firms influences firm performance (Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Nath and 
Mahajan 2008) and new venture funding (Homburg et al. 2014). By linking CMO tenure 
to brand performance and cost of capital, our study generates valuable insights on how 
CMOs can demonstrate accountability to top management and present a compelling case 
for their longevity within the organization. In doing so, our study extends previous 
research in important ways. In an influential paper, Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
(1998) argue that marketers need to consider the effects of their actions on lowering 
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volatility and vulnerability of cash flows and thereby reducing the firm’s risk and cost of 
capital. More recently, the establishment of the Marketing Accountability Standards 
Board (MASB) has expanded the investment-based outlook of marketing to 
demonstrating greater accountability in the corporate boardroom (Kumar 2015). Despite 
such advances, empirical research on the effects of marketing actions on metrics such as 
working capital requirements remains scarce. Rao and Bharadwaj (2008) provide an 
analytical roadmap to show that the effect of marketing initiatives on shareholder wealth 
occurs through a stock price effect and a released working capital effect. They further 
note that integration of concepts such as brand equity and customer equity into the 
shareholder wealth equation offers the potential for deeper insights. Our study responds 
to these calls for research by linking CMO tenure to brand equity and cost of capital.  
Second, our study finds that brand equity mediates the impact of CMO tenure on 
cost of capital. This finding is consistent with the notion that marketing actions impact 
shareholder value through the creation of market-based assets (Srivastava, Shervani, and 
Fahey 1998). Previous research also shows that brand metrics such as equity and quality 
reduce the firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011). 
Our study contributes to the marketing literature by identifying CMO tenure as an 
important antecedent of brand equity. Our findings are also somewhat distinct from the 
performance effects of CEO tenure. Research on upper echelons finds that as CEO tenure 
increases, firm performance declines because of the CEO’s inability to keep pace with the 
environment (Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick 2006; Miller 1991). In contrast, the 
curvilinear impact of CMO tenure on brand equity was not supported in our study (only 
the linear term is positive and significant, see Column II of Table 1.8). The theoretical 
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implication is that stability of marketing executives in the C-suite is an important 
precursor for managing brand equity.  
Furthermore, our findings show that even though CMO tenure does not have an 
impact on the stock price (measured by impact on Tobin’s Q), it does impact shareholder 
wealth through a released working capital effect. The theoretical implication for 
researchers is that CMO longevity needs to be evaluated based on returns generated for a 
dollar of capital deployed. Research that focuses on articulating the value of CMOs based 
on just stock price enhancements is likely to short-sell their influence on shareholder 
wealth creation (Rao and Bharadwaj 2008). Our findings are similar in spirit to research 
in finance and accounting that link corporate policies such as stock cross-listings and 
corporate social responsibility to cost of capital (Hail and Leuz 2009; El Ghoul et al. 
2011).  
 Third, our study identifies moderators for the CMO tenure-brand equity 
relationship and offers valuable insights into the CMO-CEO interface. We find that the 
marketing experience of the CEO strengthens the positive impact of CMO tenure on 
brand equity. This finding is consistent with previous research which finds that team 
members with shared functional background will excel at identifying and bundling the 
distributed valuable pieces of functional information available in the TMT quickly into 
purposeful, well targeted market offerings (Buyl et al. 2011). Likewise, we find that prior 
same-firm experience of the CMO and CEO strengthens the positive relationship between 
CMO tenure and brand equity. Broadly, our findings echo the view that top management 
teams perform better when there are shared mental models amongst members. In our 
context, CEO marketing experience and prior ties between the CEO and CMO appears to 
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increase task and relationship familiarity, both of which are critical to ensuring CMO 
longevity and improved brand performance.  
We also find that CEOs who are generalists, or have more broad skills, weaken 
the positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity. This finding is 
consistent with the view that generalist CEOs are growth oriented and pursue more 
acquisitions (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013). Their superficial knowledge of 
marketing along with a stronger drive for growth perhaps makes them push for trajectory 
changes frequently and thereby impede continuity in marketing efforts. The negative 
moderating effect of CEO’s broad skills is inconsistent with research that finds that 
exposure to more industries and functions would increase understanding and cooperation 
with CMOs (Buyl et al. 2011). Our study should encourage future researchers to include 
the general skills of the CEO in models that examine the tenure of marketing leaders. 
1.5.2 Implications for Practice 
 Our study offers numerous insights for marketing practice. The CMO Council 
conducted a survey of more than 1,000 C-level executives, including chief marketing 
officers, to understand practitioner concerns about marketing accountability and 
measurement. An overwhelming 80% of the marketing executives were unhappy with 
their current ability to measure performance (Kumar 2015; Stewart 2009). Our findings 
show that even when CMO tenure is not significantly related to Tobin’s Q, it has 
economically meaningful effects of releasing working capital through lowering the cost 
of capital. This finding should encourage marketing executives to demonstrate their value 
to CEOs and CFOs by linking their actions to the released cash that is available for 
outside investment. In other words, a solitary focus on demonstrating stock price 
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enhancements might not paint a complete picture of the tenure effects of CMOs on 
shareholder wealth creation.  
Further, our finding that CMO tenure impacts cost of capital through brand equity 
exhorts CMOs to bear in mind the impact of their efforts and actions on brand 
performance. This implication is not trivial because with mounting pressure for 
accountability, CMOs often pursue short-term growth that boosts cash flows but are not 
necessarily beneficial for brand health. Echoing this sentiment, many marketing 
executives often wonder whether CMOs are the best brand guardians given the rise of 
short-termism amongst CEOs and CFOs (Chahal 2016). Our study suggests that by 
linking CMO tenure to brand equity and cost of capital, marketers should be able to 
address this dichotomy. A lower cost of capital should translate into a lower discount rate 
and impact net present value. Therefore, CEOs need to emphasize brand building in the 
CMO’s job description and ensure accountability by considering the wealth created in the 
firm per dollar of capital invested. 
Our study also provides valuable insights into CEO related factors, which enhance 
or weaken the effect of CMO tenure on brand equity. We find that when CEOs have 
marketing experience, the effect of CMO tenure on brand equity is strengthened. To 
understand the managerial relevance of our moderating effects further, we conducted a 
“What-If” analysis. Results of this analysis appear in Table 1.9. For this analysis, we 
examined the impact of a 12-month increase in CMO tenure on brand equity and cost of 
capital for different levels of our moderators. When CMO tenure is increased by 12 
months, brand equity is higher and cost of capital is lower when the CEO has marketing 
experience (brand equity = 71.30; cost of capital = 3.8%) as opposed to when the CEO 
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does not have marketing experience (brand equity = 70.54; cost of capital = 4.1%). 
Therefore, the difference in financing costs at different levels of CEO marketing 
experience is .3%. Given that the average firm capital (equity + debt) is $31 billion, the 
released working capital due to lower financing costs is $93 million.  
We also find that the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity is strengthened when 
CMOs and CEOs have prior same-firm experience. As before, we performed additional 
analyses to quantify this effect. The results show that the impact of a 12-month increase 
in CMO tenure on brand equity and cost of capital is greater when the CMO and CEO 
have same-firm prior experience (brand equity = 73.92, cost of capital = 3.5%) opposed 
to when the CMO and CEO have no same-firm prior experience (brand equity = 70.67, 
cost of capital = 4%). This difference translates into a released working capital of $155 
million. Prior ties between CMOs and CEOs have economically meaningful effects in 
enabling CMOs with longer tenures to improve performance. Anecdotal reports that 
CEOs hiring their “buddies” into the executive suite would stifle performance are not 
validated by data in the context of CMOs. The implication for CEOs is that they should 
leverage their network and hire CMOs with whom they have prior ties, as this can ease 
frictions in the ongoing relationship.     
Finally, the results show that the greatest threat to CMOs seeking consistency in 
marketing programs is generalist CEOs. To quantify this effect, we examine the impact 
of a 12-month increase in CMO tenure on brand equity at different levels of CEO general 
ability. To do this, we create three levels of CEO general ability: low general ability, 
average general ability and high general ability, by setting the CEO general ability 
variable at 10%, 50% and 90% levels. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 
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1.9. For low general ability, a 12-month increase in CMO tenure results in a cost of 
capital of 3.1%. In contrast, a 12-month increase in CMO tenure for high general ability 
yields a cost of capital of 5%. This 1.9% difference in financing costs translates into a 
value of $589 million. This analysis shows that generalist CEOs pose a significant 
impediment to the CMO’s ability to improve brand equity and lower cost of capital. The 
implication is that CMOs working for CEOs with low general ability (i.e., specialist 
CEOs) are in a better position to demonstrate their worth through brand performance and 
cost of capital.  
While our study offers valuable insights about the importance of CMO tenure, the 
findings are not without limitations. First, the context of our analysis was limited to 
primarily business-to-consumer firms. The finding that CMO tenure is beneficial from 
the standpoint of improving brand equity and lowering cost of capital needs to be 
interpreted with this caveat in mind. Our choice of examining business-to-consumer firms 
was guided by business press reports that despite the importance of marketing in these 
industries, tenure of CMOs varies greatly. Thus, caution is needed before generalizing 
our findings to other settings. Second, because our primary interest was in understanding 
the factors between the CEO and CMO that impacted the effect of CMO tenure on brand 
equity and subsequently the firms cost of capital, we focused on CMOs who reported 
directly to the CEO. This could bias the sample towards more powerful CMOs. As such, 
results need to be interpreted with caution when applying to instances where the CMO 
does not directly report to the CEO. Lastly, although we propose that CMO tenure 
impacts brand equity positively because of greater continuity in marketing programs, we 
are unable to explicitly measure this mechanism. Therefore, it is incorrect to directly 
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attribute our findings to this mechanism. The challenge is that it is difficult to develop 
reasonable proxies for marketing program continuity using secondary data. A promising 
line of inquiry would be to use survey measures to explicitly measure these intermediate 
outcomes.  
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Table 1.1 An Overview of Previous Research on Chief Marketing Officers and Firm Performance 
Study CMO 
Presence  
CMO 
Tenure 
Performance 
Effects 
Key Findings 
Nath and 
Mahajan 
(2008) 
√ X √ CMO presence has no impact on firm performance. Firms have a higher 
propensity for CMO presence when firm is branded house, when CEO is 
outsider and when TMT marketing experience, product differentiation and 
innovation levels are high. 
Boyd, 
Chandy, and 
Cunha, Jr. 
(2010) 
√ X √ CMOs create less value when customer power is high.  When CMO has more 
role-specific experience and when prior firm performance is greater the 
effect is attenuated; when CMO is insider and when firm is large, this affect 
is intensified.  
Homburg et 
al. (2014)  
√ X √ New ventures are more likely to receive funding when CMO has marketing 
and industry experience and a respected educational background. 
Competitive intensity positively moderates the relationship between industry 
and prior start-up experience on the likelihood of receiving funding.  
Germann, 
Ebbes, and 
Grewal 
(2015) 
√ X √ CMO presence positively impacts firm financial performance. Specifically, 
their findings suggest that the performance (measured in terms of Tobin's q) 
of the sample firms that employ a CMO is, on average, approximately 15% 
greater than that of the sample firms that do not employ a CMO. This result 
is robust to the type of model specification used 
Nath and 
Mahajan 
(2017) 
√ √ X Factors that increase likelihood of CMO turnover include poor sales growth 
and poor firm profitability. New CEO appointments enhances likelihood of 
CMO turnover except when firm is highly profitable. CMO turnover has an 
inverted U relationship with TMT marketing experience and CMO tenure.  
Current Study √ √ √ Longer CMO tenure results in higher brand equity and reduces cost of capital 
through its impact on brand equity. The impact of CMO tenure on brand 
equity is strengthened when the CEO has prior marketing experience and 
when the CEO and CMO have same-firm prior experience. CEO general 
ability weakens the relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity. 
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Table 1.2 Variable Operationalization and Data Sources 
 
Measure Variable  Operationalization Data Sources 
CMO Tenure CMOTEN Time in months from the CMO’s appointment until CMO Exit or 
end of 2013.   
CMOs on the move  
and news releases 
Brand equity BEQUITY Customer perceptions about the brand’s overall health  Brand Asset 
Valuator 
Firm Cost of 
Capital 
CoC (Proportion Equity*Cost of Equity) + (Proportion Debt*Cost of 
Debt) 
COMPUSTAT, 
CRSP,  
Yahoo! Charts, 
Fama French  
& Liquidity Factors 
CEO Prior 
Marketing 
Experience 
CEOMKT Dummy variable indicating whether the CEO had experience in a 
marketing role; 1= Marketing Experience, 0= Otherwise. 
Corporate 
Affiliations   
and executive 
biographies 
Same-Firm 
Prior 
Experience 
CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP Dummy variable coded as 1 if the CEO and CMO have worked at 
the same firm in the past, 0 otherwise 
Corporate 
Affiliations  
and executive 
biographies  
CEO General 
Ability 
CEOGENAB Principal component score of five measures a) Number of 
positions held by the CEO in the past b) Number of firms in 
which the CEO worked, c) Number of industries worked in by the 
CEO, d) Previous CEO experience and e) Conglomerate 
experience 
Corporate 
Affiliations   
and executive 
biographies 
CMO Gender CMOGENDER Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO is female (1) or 
male (0) 
Corporate 
Affiliations  
and executive 
biographies 
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CMO MBA CMOMBA Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO has an MBA (1) or 
not (0) 
Corporate 
Affiliations   
and executive 
biographies 
CMO Internal CMOINTERN Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO was hired from 
inside the firm (1) or was an external hire (0) 
Corporate 
Affiliations   
and executive 
biographies 
CMO 
Executive Vice 
President Title 
CMOEVPTITLE Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO has the title 
“Executive Vice President”, 1= Executive Vice President, 
0=Otherwise 
CMOs on the move  
and news releases 
CEO Change CEOCHANGE Dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a new CEO, 1= 
CEO change, 0=otherwise. 
Firm annual filings 
CMO General 
Ability 
CMOGENAB Principal component score of five measures a) Number of 
positions held by the CMO in the past b) Number of firms in 
which the CMO worked, c) Number of industries worked in by 
the CMO, d) Previous CMO experience and e) Conglomerate 
experience 
Corporate 
Affiliations  
and executive 
biographies 
CEO Tenure CEOTEN Time in months from the CEO’s appointment until CEO exit or 
end of 2013 
COMPUSTAT 
Advertising 
Intensity  
ADINTEN Ratio of advertising expenditures of the firm to total sales. COMPUSTAT 
Firm Earnings FIRMEARNINGS Firm’s earnings before taxes and interest COMPUSTAT 
SGA Intensity SGAINTEN Selling, General and Administrative expenses scaled by total sales COMPUSTAT 
Total Assets ASSETS Total Assets COMPUSTAT 
Analyst 
Coverage 
ANALYCOV The average number of analysts following a firm for each year I/B/E/S 
Industry I1, I2, I3 Dummy variable for industry sectors. I1 = Manufacturing (SICs COMPUSTAT 
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Dummy 0100-04999), I2 = Retail (SICs 5000-5999), I3 = Services (SICs 
6000-9999) 
Year Dummy Y1-Y9 Dummy variable for years 2004-2012, Base year 2013  
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Table 1.3 Frequency Distribution of Firms by Industry 
SIC Code Industry Frequency 
15 Home Builders 1.38% 
20 Consumer Food Mfg. 8.63% 
22-23 Apparel Mfg. 2.98% 
25-28 Mattresses, Sanitary Products, Newspaper, 
Publishing & Cosmetics 
5.44% 
30-31 Tires and Leather Mfg. 1.17% 
34-39 Shaving, Computers, Telecommunications & 
Photography 
7.02% 
44-45 Cruise Lines and Airlines 1.49 % 
47-48 Cable and Satellite Communication 8.94% 
50-51 Durable Goods Wholesalers and Retailers 2.66% 
52 Home Improvement Retailers  1.49% 
53-54 General Merchandise and Food Stores 6.81% 
56-59 Apparel, Consumer Electronics & Restaurants 27.47% 
60-63 Banks and Financial Services 16.18% 
70 Hotels 0.96% 
72 Personal Services 1.81% 
73 Software 3.09% 
75 & 79 Car Rental and Resorts 2.45% 
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. No. of Observations 
Panel A: CMO characteristics    
CMO Tenure ** 34.58 21.96 986 
CMO Presence .80 .35 1,269 
CMO Gender .35 .48 991 
CMO MBA .46 .50 976 
CMO Internal .33 .47 980 
CMO Exec VP Title .21 .41 1,269 
CMO General Ability -.01 1.34 936 
Panel B: CEO characteristics    
CEO General Ability .09 1.27 1,248 
CEO Prior Marketing Experience .17 .38 1,255 
Same-Firm Prior Experience .09 .29 1,269 
CEO Change .16 .36 1,269 
CEO Tenure ** 66.26 73.88 1,514 
Panel C: Firm characteristics    
Advertising Intensity .05 .05 1,268 
Firm Earnings*  2976 6328 1,040 
Brand Equity 71.15 23.64 1,219 
SGA Intensity .27 .15 1,757 
Total Assets* 16,078.05 107,943.5 1,151 
Average Analyst Coverage 10.37 6.07 2,152 
Firm Cost of Capital .04 .07 1,213 
*in millions USD, ** in months 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
 
Table 1.5 Weibull Regression Results of The Determinants of CMO Tenure 
 
Variable 
 
CMO Tenure  
CMO Gender -.16 **  
[.07] 
CMO MBA -.19 *** 
[.07] 
CMO Internal 
 
.05 
[.08] 
CMO EVP Title .21 *** 
[.08] 
CEO Change -.17 *           
[.09] 
CEO Marketing Experience -.10 
[.09] 
Firm Earnings 1.5x 10-5   ** 
[6.76x10-6] 
Advertising Intensity .58 
[.59] 
Industry Dummy 1 -.15 
[.10] 
Industry Dummy 2 -.30 *** 
[.10] 
Year Dummies Included 
ln p .79 
[.05] 
p (duration dependence) 2.20 
[.12] 
Log Likelihood -391.62 
Number of observations 835 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Table 1.6 GLS Results of CMO Tenure on Cost of Capital and Brand Equity 
 
Variable 
Column I   
Effect of CMO 
Tenure on 
Brand Equity 
Column II 
Effect of CMO 
Tenure on CoC 
Column III 
Effect of CMO 
Tenure on Cost 
of Equity 
Column IV 
Effect of CMO 
Tenure on Cost 
of Debt 
Column V  
Effect of 
CMO Tenure 
on Beta 
Column VI 
Direct Effect of 
CMO Tenure on 
Brand Equity 
 
 
CMOTENURÊ  
.065***  
[.016] 
-.00025*** 
[.00004] 
-.00003** 
[.000] 
.0005 
[.002] 
-.0022*** 
[.0008] 
.094*** 
[.014] 
CEO Prior 
Marketing 
Experience 
-1.58 
[1.42] 
    -.055 
[.56] 
Prior Same-Firm 
Experience 
-1.45 
[1.90] 
    3.66*** 
[.71] 
CEO General Ability 1.81*** 
[.48] 
    1.12*** 
[.014] 
CMOTENURÊ * 
CEO Prior 
Marketing 
Experience 
.03* 
[.02] 
     
CMOTENURÊ * 
Prior Same-Firm 
Experience 
.05** 
[.02] 
      
CMOTENURÊ *CEO 
General Ability  
-.01** 
[.005] 
     
Controls          
CMO General 
Ability 
-.15  
[.15] 
    -.094 
[.15] 
CEO Tenure  -4.0 x 10-5*** 
[8.46x10-6] 
-5.44x10-6*** 
[2.03x10-6] 
.0002  
[.0003] 
.0002  
[.0001] 
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SGA Intensity  -.048 *** 
[.0059] 
.0012 
[.001] 
.132 
[.183] 
.191** 
[.095] 
 
Total Assets  5.85x10-8 ***  
[2.28x10-8] 
1.95x10-9  
[8.1x10-9] 
-7.71x10-8  
[6.39x10-7] 
5.08x10-7* 
[2.91x10-7] 
 
Analyst Coverage  -.0011*** 
[.0001] 
-.00009*** 
[.000] 
.0046 
[.0057] 
.006 
[.0018] 
 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Intercept 56.81*** 
[2.10] 
.09*** 
[.007] 
.03*** 
[.0016] 
-.0039 
[1.56] 
1.27*** 
[.129] 
.094*** 
[.014] 
N 758 669 609 669 669 758 
𝜒2(d.f.)   748.69 (16) 1033516 (16) 4.01 (16) 165.14 (16) 1282.54 (16) 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 1.7 GLS Results of The Impact of Brand Equity on Cost of Capital 
 
Variable 
Column I 
Indirect Effect 
of CMO 
Tenure on Cost 
of Capital 
Column II 
Indirect Effect 
of CMO 
Tenure on Cost 
of Equity  
Column III 
Indirect Effect 
of CMO 
Tenure on Cost 
of Debt 
Column IV 
Indirect Effect 
of CMO 
Tenure on Beta 
 
 BEQUITŶ  
 
-.001*** 
[.00] 
-.0005*** 
[.00] 
 .004  
[.029] 
-.03*** 
[.007] 
CMOTENURÊ  
-7.67x10-5 
[.00] 
6.76x10-6 
[.00] 
 .0005  
[.0029] 
.0009 
[.001] 
Controls     
CEO Tenure -.00007*** 
[9.46x10-6] 
-5.58x10-6** 
[2.82x10-6]  
 .0001 
[.0004] 
.0002 
[.0002] 
SGA Intensity -.07 *** 
[.006] 
.0017  
[.001] 
 .10 
[.176] 
.136 
[.088] 
Total Assets 6.96x10-8*** 
[2.58x10-8] 
-7.6x10-10 
[8.54x10-9]  
1.20x10-9 
[8.85x10-7] 
6.15x10-7*** 
[2.25x10-7] 
Analyst 
Coverage 
-.0016*** 
[.00] 
-.00006** 
[.00] 
-.0002 
[.008] 
-.0039** 
[.0018] 
Industry 
Specific Effects 
Included Included Included Included 
Year Specific 
Effects 
Included Included Included Included 
Intercept .17*** 
[.018] 
.058*** 
[.007] 
-.12 
[2.5] 
3.08*** 
[.389]  
N 609 609 609 609 
𝜒2(d.f.) 3595.57 (17) 1033516 (17) 1.66 (17) 329.88 (17) 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 1.8 Robustness Checks: Tests for Alternate Explanations 
 
Variable 
Column I 
Effect of CMO 
Tenure on TQ 
Column II 
Non-linear Effects 
of CMO Tenure on 
Brand Equity 
CMOTENURÊ  
-.001 
[.0008] 
.07*** 
[.02] 
CMOTENURÊ
2
  -.8.77x 10
-5 
[6.6 x 10-5] 
Prior Same-Firm Experience  -1.11 
[1.45] 
CEO Prior Marketing Experience  -2.3** 
[1.2] 
CEO General Ability  1.3*** 
[.4] 
CMOTENURÊ * Prior Same-Firm 
Experience 
 .02 
[.02] 
CMOTENURÊ * CEO Prior Marketing 
Experience 
 .05*** 
[.02] 
CMOTENURÊ * CEO General Ability   -.01** 
[.00] 
Controls   
CMO General Ability   
CEO Tenure .0003* 
[.0002] 
 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
SGA Intensity -.059 *** 
[.0068] 
 
Total Assets 3.18x10-8  
[1.94x10-8] 
 
ROA 1.05*** 
[.14] 
 
Leverage -6.9x10-7 * 
[3.59x10-7] 
 
Intercept 1.34   *** 
[.115] 
54.3*** 
[2.25] 
N 792 861 
𝜒2(d.f.)  536.8 (15) 108.6 (20) 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
  
  
5
4 
Table 1.9 Post Hoc Analyses: Assessing the Managerial Relevance of CMO Tenure and Cost of Capital 
 
Effect of 12-month increase in CMO 
Tenure under conditions of 
Predicted 
Brand Equity  
Predicted Cost 
of Capital 
Financing Costs 
 (Unit: millions) 
Released Working 
Capital 
(Unit: Millions) 
No CEO MKT Experience 70.54 4.1% $1271 
$1271-$1178= $93 CEO MKT Experience 71.30 3.8% $1178 
No Same-Firm Prior Experience 70.67 4% $1240 
$1240-$1085= $155 
Same-Firm Prior Experience 73.92 3.5% $1085 
Low CEO General Ability 76.45 3.1% $961 
$1550-$961= $589 Average CEO General Ability 69.92 4.1% $1271 
High CEO General Ability 65.38 5% $1550 
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